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Abstract
For the past decade, the author has examined North Korean primary public documents
and concludes that there have been changes of identities and ideas in the public discourse
of human rights in the DPRK: from strong post-colonialism to Marxism-Leninism, from
there to the creation of Juche as the state ideology and finally ‘our style’ socialism. %is
paper explains the background to Kim Jong Il’s ‘our style’ human rights in North Korea: his
broader framework, ‘our style’ socialism, with its two supporting ideational mechanisms,
named ‘virtuous politics’ and ‘military-first politics’. It analyses how some of these charac-
teristics have disappeared while others have been reinforced over time. Marxism has signif-
icantly withered away since the end of the Cold War, and communism was finally deleted
from the latest  amended Socialist Constitution, whereas the concept of sovereignty has
been strengthened and the language of duties has been actively employed by the authority
almost as a relapse to the feudal Confucian tradition.%e paper also includes some first-hand
accounts from North Korean defectors interviewed in South Korea in October–December
.%ey show the perception of ordinary North Koreans on the ideas of human rights.
Keywords
North Korea; ‘our style’ human rights; military-first politics; virtuous politics; Confucianism
%is paper seeks to discover the various sources of human rights ideas in the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) and anal-
yse the socio-political outcomes in its domestic and foreign policies, especially
after the end of the Cold War. Unknown to many people, the DPRK has been
producing its own discourse on human rights since the end of the Second
World War.1 Presumably, the evolution of the North Korean understanding of
1) Starting from the  Programme of Action for People’s Sovereignty, the authority
exacted the  Gender Equality Law, the  Land Reform Law, the  Regulation
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human rights has taken a considerably diﬀerent route from that of a Western
society. Soon after the Japanese colonialists left Korea, the Soviet army arrived
in North Korea. All Japanese remnants were denied and a new modern struc-
ture and institutions were built up under heavy Soviet military influence. Kim
Il Sung, who became head of state, created his own ideology called Chuch’e
which meant ideological self-reliance, economic self-suﬃciency and military
self-defence.2 Kim Jong Il, the current leader and Kim Il Sung’s son, developed
this national ideology as ‘our style’ socialism along with ‘virtuous politics’ and
‘military-first politics’. Beneath all this ideational transformation, the indige-
nous political cultural traditions have played invisible but significant roles.
%e concept of ‘human rights’ evolved from Western liberal ideas on per-
sonal life and property, and away from absolute power. %e origins of liberal
human rights are deeply related to the Lockean concept of personal liberty
in an absolute monarchy, deeply rooted in Christianity3 and the tradition of
positive law in Western countries. %is liberal concept of the rights of man,
in contrast to the rights of the citizen, was immediately challenged by con-
servatives like Edmund Burke or %omas Hobbes. Karl Marx also denied the
for the Composition and Duties of Justice Ministry, Courts and Prosecution Oﬃces, the
Twenty-Point Party Platform, the  Labour Law for Labourers and OﬃceWorkers
and finally the  People’s Constitution, which all included provisions of human rights.
%e first Socialist Constitution in  also contained the list of human rights and duties
of citizens and the following amendments in ,  and  all allocated a section
for rights and duties. %e author examined the entire  volumes of !e Works of Kim Il
Sung and  of !e Selected Works of Kim Jong Il as well as the monthly magazines of the
Korean Workers’ Party such as Ku˘lloja (Workers) and Ch’oˇllima (,-ri Horse) and the
party’s oﬃcial newspaper, Rodong Sinmun (Workers’ Daily) for her PhD and discovered a
huge volume of North Korean primary documents on its own concepts of human rights.
2) For a general history of the DPRK, see Dae-Sook Suh,Korean Communism, –: A
Reference Guide to the Political System (Honolulu: University Press of Hawai’i, ); Robert
A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, Communism in Korea (Berkeley: University of California
Press, ); Dae-Sook Suh,!e Korean Communist Movement, – (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, ); Dae-Sook Suh, Kim Il Sung: !e North Korean Leader
(New York: Columbia University Press, ); Bruce Cumings, !e Origins of the Korean
War I: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes – (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, ).
3) %e role of Christianity was significant for the early formation of natural rights. See John
Finnis,Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon, ); Micheline R. Ishay,!e
History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalisation Era (Berkeley: University
of California Press, ); Jacques Maritain, Man and the State (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, ); JeremyWaldron,!eories of Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
).
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bourgeois concept of the rights of man as an egoistic individual.4 After the Sec-
ond World War, these originally Western ideas of human rights have become
internationalised and the debates have been more complex and sophisticated:
civil/political rights vs socio-economic rights,5 universality6 vs cultural relativ-
ity,7 individual rights vs collective rights8 or rights vs duties.
4) Jeremy Waldron writes thought-provoking critiques of Bentham, Burke and Marx on
rights. See Jeremy Waldron, Nonsense upon Stilts: Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of
Man (London: Methuen, ).
5) For the debate on the validity of socio-economic rights, see Maritain.Man and the State;
Jean Rivero, Human Rights, France and the United States of America (New York: Center
for the Study of Human Rights at Columbia University, ); Maurice Cranston, What
Are Human Rights? (New York: Basic Books, ); Michael Freeden, Rights (Buckingham:
OpenUniversity Press, ); JackDonnelly,Universal Human Rights in!eory and Practice,
second edition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, ).
6) Jack Donnelly is the foremost proponent of the universality of human rights. See Neil
Mitchell, RhodaHoward and JackDonnelly, ‘Liberalism, human rights and human dignity’,
American Political Science Review,Vol.  (), pp. –; Donnelly,Universal Human
Rights; Jack Donnelly, !e Concept of Human Rights (London: Croom Helm, ); Jack
Donnelly, ‘Human rights and Asian values: a defense of “Western” universalism’, in Joanne
R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell (eds) !e East Asian Challenge for Human Rights (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, ).
7) Dunne andWheeler’s book is a good start to understanding all major debates on contem-
porary human rights. An-Na’im suggests a constructive approach for cross-cultural dialogue.
For more on cultural relativity, see A.J.M. Milne, Human Rights and Human Diversity: An
Essay in the Philosophy of Human Rights (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press,
); Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, Human Rights in Global Politics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, ); Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im (ed.) Human Rights in
Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, ); James W. Nickel, ‘Cultural diversity and human rights’, in Jack L. Nelson and
Vera M. Green (eds) International Human Rights: Contemporary Issues (Stanfordville, NY:
Human Rights Publishing Group, ), pp. –; James W. Nickel, Making Sense of
Human Rights: Philosophical Reflections on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Berke-
ley: University of California Press, ).
8) For collective rightists, see A.M.Honoré, ‘Groups, laws, and obedience’, in A.W.B. Simp-
son (ed.) Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ), pp. –;
Michael McDonald, ‘Should communities have rights? Reflections on liberal individual-
ism’, in Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im (ed.) Human Rights in Cross-cultural Perspectives: A
Quest for Consensus (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, ), pp. –.
For communitarian idealists, see Richard E. Flathman, !e Practice of Rights (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, );%omas H. Green, ‘Lectures on the principles of polit-
ical obligation’, in Paul Harris and John Morrow (eds) T.H. Green Lectures on the Principles
of Political Obligation and Other Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, );
F.H. Bradley, Ethical Studies (London: Oxford University Press, ).
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%ere was no room for Western liberal concepts or institutions of human
rights in the DPRK. However, this does not mean that the DPRK’s under-
standing of human rights is completely outside international debates on the
concepts of human rights.
%e paper first explains the background to Kim Jong Il’s ‘our style’ human
rights with its two supporting ideational mechanisms, named ‘virtuous politics’
and ‘military-first politics’. Second, it elaborates on the contents of ‘our style’
human rights: strong post-colonial nationalism, some Marxist residue and
indigenous Korean political cultures. %ird, it analyses how some of these
characteristics have disappeared while others have been reinforced over time.
Finally, the paper also includes some of the first-hand accounts from North
Korean defectors whom the author interviewed in South Korea in October–
December .%ey show the perception of ordinary North Koreans on the
ideas of human rights.
Kim Jong Il’s ‘Our Style’ Human Rights
‘Our style’ human rights first appeared in a Rodong Sinmun article published
on  June  under the title, ‘For the protection of true human rights’
(ch’amdaun ingwo˘n onghoru˘l wihayo˘).%e article states that:
in order to protect and fully realise ‘our style’ socialism along with ‘our style’ human
rights, one should thoroughly comprehendChuch’e Ideology and be loyal to the Korean
Workers’ Party [KWP] and the leader, by whom the greatest rights and true human
rights can be granted … it is virtuous politics that can protect human rights to the
highest degree.9
%e main characteristics of ‘our style’ human rights are, therefore, citizens’
duties and loyalty to the party and the leader, in return for the protection
of basic subsistence rights and security. Second, it is the conception that
rights are granted, not entitled inherently when a person is born, a concept
generally understood in theWestern liberal natural-law tradition.%ere are two
metaphorical pillars to support Kim Jong-Il’s ‘our style’ human rights: virtuous
politics and military-first politics.
9) Anonymous, ‘Ch’amda’un ingwo˘n’u˘l wihayo˘’ (For true human rights), Rodong Sinmun (
June ).
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‘Virtuous Politics’
‘Virtuous politics’ (indo˘k cho˘ngch’i) refers to the governing style of Kim Jong
Il that focuses on the benevolent role of the leader. %e DPRK government
first introduced the term ‘virtuous politics’ in a Rodong Sinmun article on 
January , insisting that Kim Jong Il had implemented the best ‘virtuous
policies’ with dignity and love for the people. Kim Jong Il explains that the
origin of ‘virtuous politics’ derives from Kim Il Sung’s anti-Japanese guerrilla
movement in the s, and is reflected in ‘the Ten-Point Platform of National
Liberation’ (choguk kwangbok sipdae kangryo˘ng). %e Platform stresses Kim Il
Sung’s ‘believing in the people as in heaven’, ‘the best form of humanitarian-
ism’, which is the source of the granted human rights in the DPRK.10 Examples
of ‘virtuous politics’ were listed, along with activities such as sending birthday
gifts to those turning  or , congratulating parents on the birth of quadru-
plets, or delivering a special emergency service to remote areas.%e condition
to the realisation of ‘virtuous politics’ is, however, people’s endless loyalty to
the leader.
Kim Jong Il inherits the ‘believing in the people as in heaven’ tradition from
his father, and made it the basis for his politics on human rights.%e ‘General’
(i.e. Kim Jong Il) is ‘the leader who believes in and worships his people like
Heaven, always thinks of his people first, and treats their happiness and wounds
like his own’.11 Relating to a concept of anti-discrimination, Nada Dakasi
defines ‘virtuous politics’ as a political belief ‘to treat people with love and trust
without any kind of discrimination’ and ‘to embrace even those who havemade
mistakes in the past’.12Kim Jong Il’s ‘virtuous politics’ is arguably an equivalent
concept to Plato’s philosopher-king in!e Republic, or the benevolent king in
Confucianism.13%e claim ofmoral superiority over other political systems was
also a prevalent theme in all previous socialist states. As Kim Jong Il argued:
10) Ch’oe Ch’o˘l Ung, ‘Chuch’e sasang’u˘n ch’oego’u˘i indojuu˘i’ (Chuch’e Ideology is the best
humanitarianism), Ch’o˘rhak yo˘ngu (Philosophical Studies), Vol.  (), p. .
11) Ch’o˘rhakyo˘nguso (Institute for Philosophy), Sahoejuu˘i Kangso˘ngdaeguk Ko˘nso˘l Sasang
(%e Ideology on Construction of a Great Socialist State) (Pyongyang: Social Science Press,
), p. .
12) Nada Dakasi, Kim Jong Il Sidae’u˘i Choso˘n (Korea in the Era of Kim Jong Il) (Pyongyang:
Foreign Languages Publishing House, ), p. .
13) Jiyoung Song, ‘Human rights and the DPRK after the Cold War: a constructivist
approach’, MPhil dissertation (Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge,
), p. .
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%e virtuous politics of the Party … would look after and encourage misbehaving peo-
ple so that they can continue their socio-political lives eternally. For the implementa-
tion of ‘virtuous politics’, a political leader with endless love for his people must lead
the socialist ruling party as a ‘mother party’. Under this leadership, political freedom
and human rights of the People can be genuinely protected.14
%e caring role of a political leader can be traced back to Choso˘n Confucian
tradition, as in the Mencian notion of a benevolent leader.15 It is found in Kim
Jong Il’s ‘our style’ human rights, much more noticeably than in Kim Il Sung’s
Chuch’e rights. Although the government oﬃcially denounces Confucianism as
belonging to a negative feudal past, there are numerous examples of Confucian
influence in contemporary North Korean rights thinking. For example, the
protection of human rights is considered a reward bestowed by the leader. Kim
Jong Il insists that
writers and artists … enjoy high political trust and enormous care endorsed by the
Great Leader. In the past, they were neglected and downgraded with no proper pro-
tection of fundamental human rights or freedom. Now, they are even given honorary
titles as revolutionary artists
and, by implication, the protection of human rights is ‘given’ by the leader.16
%e Confucian notion of ‘virtuous politics’ is prevalent in the North Korean
constitution.%emessage of ‘virtuous politics’ is clear in the preface of the 
constitution, which stated that
Comrade Kim Il Sung regarded ‘believing in the people as in heaven’ [inminwich’ o˘n]
as his motto, and that he was always with the people, devoted his whole life to them,
took care of and guided them with a noble politics of benevolence, and turned the
whole society into one big and united family.
Kim Jong Il pays tribute to the benevolent policies of his father, saying that
suryo˘ng (Head of State, i.e. Kim Il Sung) has set the principles for other major
welfare legislation including the Law on Nurseries and the Upbringing of
14) Kim Jong Il, ‘Sahoejuu˘inu˘n kwahagida’ (Socialism is science), Rodong Sinmun (Novem-
ber ).
15) ‘Choso˘n Confucianism’ refers to the dominant governing philosophy shared among
upper-class scholar-oﬃcials, the yangban, in the early to mid-Choso˘n dynasty (–).
16) Kim Jong Il, ‘Yo˘nghwa ch’angjak’eso˘’u˘i saero’un yangyang’u˘l yiru˘kilde daehayo˘’ (For the
improvement of creativeness in movie-making), in Selected Works of Kim Jong Il : –
 (Pyongyang: Korean Workers’ Party Press, – /), pp. –.
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Children, the Public Health Law, the Labour Law and the Land Law.17 Most
of these laws were on socio-economic rights, and human rights are explained
as duties of the virtuous leader.
Humanity was also the main theme in Sirhak (Practical Learning)18 and
Tonghak (Eastern Learning).19 Sirhak scholars argued that learning had to
enhance people’s lives and relieve the plight of peasants.20 Tonghak founded its
philosophical ground on a belief that ‘human beings are heaven’ (innaech’o˘n).21
‘Virtuous politics’ had been deeply embedded in indigenous Korean culture
long before the arrival of Marxism in North Korea.
‘Military-first politics’
‘Virtuous politics’ to protect people’s basic subsistence rights failed in the mid-
s. Millions of people died of hunger and malnutrition. %e government
was not able to feed its own people and asked for help from the international
humanitarian community. In other words, Kim Jong Il has not been successful
in performing his duty, as a virtuous leader, to guarantee the right to food, even
within its own conceptualisation. At the same time, the government started to
put greater emphasis on self-defence and sovereignty to unite and mobilise the
hungry masses. ‘Military-first politics’ was born out of this context.
‘Military-first politics’ is now an oﬃcial policy of the DPRK in the amended
 Socialist Constitution. It prioritises the Korean People’s Army (KPA) in
state aﬀairs, and allocates national resources to the army first. Initially, the
authority announced that ‘military-first politics’ began on  January ,
when Kim Jong Il visited the Dabaksol military base. However, the DPRK
17) Kim Jong Il, ‘Inmindaejung chungsimu˘i urisik sahoejuu˘inu˘n p’ilsu˘ngbulp’aeida’ (Our peo-
ple-oriented socialism will never lose), in Selected Works of Kim Jong Il : January–July 
(Pyongyang: Korean Workers’ Party Press,  /), p. .
18) Sirhak was a subdivision of Choso˘n Confucianism in the seventeenth–nineteenth cen-
turies. Sirhak scholars proposed limited revolutionary ideas about social reform to abolish
the hereditary slave system, and enhance commercial activities and the importing of science
and technology from China and other civilised Western countries.
19) Tonghak was created by a failed aristocrat named Ch’oe Che-u in the s, and later
developed through nationwide peasants’ uprisings.Tonghak has themost revolutionary ideas
among all indigenous Korean cultural traditions.
20) James B. Palais, Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions: Yu Hyongwon and the Late
Chosun Dynasty (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, ), p. .
21) Yong-ho Choe, Peter H. Lee andWilliam%eodore De Bary, Sources of Korean Tradition,
Volume II: From the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Centuries (New York: Columbia University
Press, ), pp. –.
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retroactively moved the inauguration of ‘military-first politics’ to  August
, when Kim Jong Il accompanied his father to the Yukyo˘ngsu tank divi-
sion in order to legitimise its historical basis.22 According to a former North
Korean security oﬃcer, since  the central party has directed the local party
apparatus to use ‘military-first politics’ instead of Chuch’e Ideology in oﬃcial
documents.23 Another former North Korean diplomat also says Chuch’e Ideol-
ogy had been completely replaced by ‘military-first politics’ by .24
Since the breakdown of state welfare and the famine of the mid-s,
the ‘family’ metaphor in ‘virtuous politics’ has no longer been convincing to
North Korean people.%e government supplemented another set of ‘military’
metaphors, through ‘military-first politics’, in order to produce a sense of
collectivity amongst the people and, more significantly, to induce absolute
loyalty to their leader. On the international front, ‘military-first politics’ also
serves as a tool to safeguard the security of the nation and the state. Like the
use of familial images, militarising society prevents people from developing
individual and liberal concepts of human rights. Still, the familial metaphor has
not completely disappeared. It frequently reappears as ‘the people are fathers
and mothers to the army and the army is sons and daughters to the people’.25
In practice, the discourse of ‘military-first politics’ leads to extreme loyalist
propaganda such as a ‘do-or-die spirit for safeguarding the leader’ (suryo˘ng
kyo˘lsa’onghwi cho˘ngsin) or ‘the spirit of guns and bombs’ (ch’ongp’okt’an cho˘ng-
sin).26 %e DPRK demonstrates that, under ‘military-first politics’, human
rights are fully protected by the ‘Great Leader’ and the party. In return, North
Koreans should defend him by paying endless loyalty and showing filial piety
to the ‘Great Leader’ and the ‘Dear Leader’.27
22) Anonymous, ‘Widaehan changgunnimu˘i so˘ngun hyo˘ngmyo˘ng ryo˘ngdo upjo˘ku˘l minjok’u˘i
che’il kukboro bitne’o˘ nakaja’ (Let us shine the great general’s military-first politics as the best
national treasure), Rodong Sinmun ( August ).
23) All interviews with North Korean defectors quoted here were recorded confidentially,
without full real names, for privacy and security reasons. Interview with P on October
, Seoul, South Korea.
24) Interview with J on  October , Seoul, South Korea.
25) Kim Cho˘l U, Army-Centred Politics of Kim Jong Il (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages
Publishing House, ), p. .
26) Ch’o˘rhakyo˘nguso, Sahoejuu˘i Kangso˘ngdaeguk Ko˘nso˘l Sasang, pp. –.
27) Cho˘ng Kyo˘ng So˘b, Chegukjuu˘ijadu˘ri Tto˘bo˘rinu˘n Ingwo˘n Ongho’u˘i Pandongso˘ng (%e
Reactionary Aspect of Imperialist Human Rights Protection) (Pyongyang: KoreanWorkers’
Party Press, ), pp. –.
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‘Military-first politics’ demonstrates two extreme types of behaviour within
the field of human rights. Targeting a domestic audience, the regime stresses
the role of the military leader to protect the security of the people, which was
also a fundamental duty expected from a Confucian ruler of traditional Korean
society, or from a strong and independent leader of a post-colonial state, rather
than just a revolutionary Marxist leader. To the international human rights
society, eﬀectively limited to the UN so far, the government puts forward its
eﬀorts to change domestic legislation that are consistent with international
human rights standards. %is pragmatic approach to human rights equates to
the DPRK’s tactical concessions for survival in international society without
compromising its national security.
%e main features of ‘our style’ human rights, drawn from primary North
Korean documents over the past decade, are () the sovereign right to national
survival, () diluted Marxist rights, () granted rights by the fatherly leader,
and finally () the use of a duty-based language of human rights.
Sovereignty and the Right to National Survival
State Sovereignty Prior to Human Rights
%e first characteristic of ‘our style’ human rights is the transformation of the
concept of the right to self-determination from the country’s post-colonial
experience to that of state sovereignty. %e right to self-determination is an
internationally recognised right supported by many other cultural relativists,28
collective rights theorists29 and communitarian idealists30 as well as leaders of
traditional communities. Later, the concept of the right to self-determination
has been transformed as the right to development by third-world countries.31
Let us have a look at Kim Jong Il’s statement on the relation between state
sovereignty and individual human rights in his article ‘Socialism is science’:
28) An-Na’im, Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives; Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Cul-
ture (Boston: Houghton Miﬄin, ); Melville J. Herskovits, Man and His Works (New
York: Knopf, ); Charles Taylor, ‘Human rights: the legal culture’, in UNESCO (ed.)
Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights (New York: UNESCO, ), pp. –.
29) Honoré, Groups, laws, and obedience, pp. –; McDonald, Should communities have
rights?.
30) Green, Lectures; Bradley, Ethical Studies.
31) Georges Abi-Saab, ‘%e legal formulation of a right to development’, in R.J. Dupuy
(ed.)!e Right to Development at the International Level (Hague: Academy of International
Law, ), p. ; Philip Alston, ‘Revitalising United Nations work on human rights and
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‘Human rights can never be realised without the defence of sovereignty. People under
foreign rule can never achieve the fulfilment of true human rights. Human rights are
the sovereign right of the People’.32
Since , the ‘sovereign right of the People’ (inminu˘i chajujo˘k kwo˘lli) has
become the main theme in the discourse of human rights in the DPRK, above
all others. Strong post-colonial nationalism was often seen as more than rev-
olutionary Marxism. Speaking on Marx and Engels’ Communist Manifesto,
‘Workers of the world, unite!’, the DPRK government supports an argument
that ‘the world’ here meant capitalist countries only, merely reflecting work-
ers’ unions in capitalist states, and excluded national liberation struggles in
colonised countries.33
%is post-colonial rights thinking on the sovereign right has been reinforced
by the trauma of national division after the Korean War; it often leads to a
strong sense of victimhood. In a reply to the then UNCommission on Human
Rights (now, the Human Rights Council) in , DPRK representatives in
Geneva stated that the North Korean people were ‘subject to the suﬀering of
national division by foreign forces’ with constant security concerns coming
from ‘never-ending threats and pressure from outside’.34 To the DPRK, the
realisation of the sovereign right of all peoples has become a natural priority.
%e concept of man has always been communitarian in North Korea, and
therefore that of the rights collective. Kim Jong Il develops his father’s concept
of man as social being into one of a ‘socio-political being’ (sahoe cho˘ngch’ijo˘k
saengmyo˘ngch’e).35 Kim Jong Il’s interpretation transforms the idea of the sov-
ereign right of ‘man’, which still contains an individualistic aspect, but with a
communitarian feature, into a more collective sense of a ‘socio-political being’.
Kim Il Sung’s ‘man’ was somewhat similar to Marx’s ‘species-being’, but Kim
development’,Melbourne University Law Review, Vol.  (), p. ; Jack Donnelly, ‘In
search of the unicorn: the jurisprudence and politics of the right to development’,California
Western International Law Journal, Vol.  (), p. .
32) Kim Jong Il, Sahoejuu˘inu˘n kwahagida.
33) Dakasi, Kim Jong Il Sidae’u˘i Choso˘n, p. .
34) UN Commission on Human Rights, ‘Questions of the violation of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in any part of the world: situation of human rights in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea’,  February .
35) Kim Jong Il, ‘Ch’o˘ngnyo˘nu˘l chojik sasangjo˘ku˘ro kanghwa hanu˘ndeso˘ naso˘nu˘n myo˘tgaji
kwa’o˘be taehayo˘’ (On some problems in strengthening Ch’ongnyo˘n organisationally and
ideologically), in Selected Works of Kim Jong Il : – (Pyongyang: Korean Workers’
Party Press, – /), pp. –.
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Jong Il’s ‘socio-political being’ is more advanced in terms of its collectivity
and unity since it depicts the entire society as one organic entity and, by
implication, man as each organ or cell.
Cho˘ng Kyo˘ng So˘b, a North Korean rights theorist, elevates Kim Jong Il’s
idea of the sovereign right of a socio-political being to a state level. Cho˘ng
insists that the struggle for the protection of human rights in the DPRK is
to protect ‘a right of the state’ (kuggwoˇn).36 %e idea of ‘the right of the state’
is similar to that of ‘the right to state development’ (guojia fazhanquan), or
the ‘right to national self-determination’ in the Chinese discourse of human
rights.37 China has developed this collective idea of human rights in the sense
that rights can be an entitlement not only of an individual but of a state or
a nation. Pang Sen argued that ‘if a nation is unable to enjoy the right to
self-determination, the citizens of that nation will not be guaranteed their
individual human rights’.38 Similarly, in North Korea, it is still the collective
nation and the state that are being emphasised rather than an individual.
!e Right to National Survival
In Korean, ‘subsistence’ (saengjon) means ‘existence’ (sara issu˘m) or ‘survival’
(sara namu˘m). In North Korea, especially after the demise of the Soviet bloc,
‘subsistence’ is not only about food, but the very issue of ‘survival’. One of
the earlier North Korean human rights commentators, Kim Ch’ang Ryo˘l, lists
three major concepts of human rights that exist in the DPRK: () a right to
human dignity, () a ‘right to survival’ (saengjonggwo˘n), and () a right to polit-
ical freedom. Among these three, the right to survival is the most distinctive.39
In practice, the DPRK government has adopted two survival strategies: one
is tactical concessions, the other the development of nuclear facilities, and both
use the language of the sovereign right of the nation to survive. North Korea
showed some behavioural change in its foreign policies by engaging with the
international human rights community.%ese laws include:
36) Cho˘ng Kyo˘ng So˘b, Chegukjuu˘ijadu˘ri Tto˘bo˘rinu˘n Ingwo˘n Ongho’u˘i Pandongso˘ng, p. .
37) Robert Weatherley, ‘Human rights in China: between Marx and Confucius’, Critical
Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, Vol.  (), p. .
38) Robert Weatherley, ‘%e evolution of Chinese thinking on human rights in the post-
Mao era’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.  (), p. .
39) Kim Ch’ang Ryo˘l, ‘Chegukjuu˘ijadu˘ri tto˘bo˘rigo itnu˘n ingwo˘n onghowa ku˘ pandongjo˘k
ponjil ’ (Imperialists’ protection of human rights and its anti-revolutionary roots)’, Ku˘lloja,
Vol.  (), pp. –.
 Jiyoung Song / EJEAS . () –
–  amended Socialist Constitution;
–  amended Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law; and
–  amended Law on Composition of the Court
as well as new legislation such as:
–  Narcotic Drugs Control Law;
–  Food Sanitation Law;
–  Law on the Prevention of Communicable Diseases;
–  Law on Protection of the Environment;
–  Family Law;
–  Law on the Protection of Persons with Disabilities;
–  Public Health Law;
–  Law on Complaints and Petitions;
–  Law on Protection of Useful Animals;
–  Law on Prevention of Sea Pollution;
–  Labour Law;
–  Law on Nurseries and the Raising of Children; and
–  Law on Control for the Protection of Land and Environment.
It amended domestic legislation to comply with international human rights
norms, a prerequisite to being part of international society according to the
English School, and invited some UN oﬃcials and international humanitarian
workers to visit or work in the country. %is is what %omas Risse, Stephen
Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink call ‘tactical concessions’, from the denial stage
in their five-phase spiral model (i.e. repression–denial–tactical concession–
prescription–norm-consistence).40 Based on their theory, activities of transna-
tional networks are most significant in changing the government’s behaviour.
However, with no such transnational network connecting North Korean peo-
ple to the outside world, the abusive government retreated back to the previous
stage in the late s.
%e DPRK government has become more persistent, adhering to its defen-
sive mentality and ideas of sovereignty.41 %e regime does not recognise the
authority of the UN Special Rapporteur on the DPRK, saying that ‘the sover-
eign right and dignity are the life of the Republic’ (unoﬃcial translation by the
40) %omas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, !e Power of Human Rights:
International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ).
41) Jiyoung Song, ‘Rights approaches to North Korea: combining criticism and constructive
engagement’, LLM dissertation (University of Hong Kong, ); Jiyoung Song, Human
rights and the DPRK.
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author of the Geneva DPRK Mission’s Statement regarding the Report of the
Special Rapporteur, Vitit Muntarbhorn, at the second meeting of the Human
Rights Council, ). At the same time, theNorth Korean regime sees nuclear
development and missile technology as part of its sovereign right to survival.
After the UN Security Council’s resolution condemning North Korea’s nuclear
and missile tests, the DPRK started reprocessing spent fuel rods. %e Korean
Central News Agency says that
%e DPRK, which regards the security of the country and the sovereignty
of the nation as its life and soul, was compelled to take measures to bolster
up deterrent for self-defence to cope with the increasing nuclear threat and
military provocations of hostile forces.42
Withering Away of Marxist Rights
Remaining Class Rights
Ideologically, socialism is still the closest political form to which the DPRK
adheres. Marx resisted the concept of human rights in capitalist states, calling
it ‘obsolete verbal rubbish’ or ‘ideological nonsense’.43 Similarly, Kim Jong Il
insists that the original democratic ideas such as freedom, equality and human
rights were ‘transformed by capitalists into a form of bourgeois democracy,
which was to further exploit and subordinate the working class by the use of
capital’.44
To the DPRK, Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin (but not Mao) were still,
oﬃcially, advocates of the repressed workingmasses.45 In , the government
explains the class-conscious conception of human rights and, notably, why
there are human rights violations against political prisoners in the DPRK:
42) Anonymous, ‘DPRK completes reprocessing of spent fuel rods’, Korean Central News
Agency ( November ), available at http://kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm (accessed  March
).
43) Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works in One Volume (London: Lawrence and
Wishart, ), p. .
44) Kim Jong Il, ‘Sahoejuu˘i’e taehan haebang’u˘n ho˘yongdoelsu upda’ (No intervention allowed
towards socialism), in Selected Works of Kim Jong Il : February –December 
(Pyongyang: Korean Workers’ Party Press, – /), pp. –.
45) Kim Jong Il, ‘Hyo˘ngmyo˘ng so˘nbaeru˘l chondae hanu˘n ko˘ssu˘n hyo˘ngmyo˘ngkadu˘ru˘i sungko-
han todo˘k u˘ru˘ida’ (Respect for senior revolutionaries is a divine ethical comradeship), in
SelectedWorks of Kim Jong Il : – (Pyongyang: KoreanWorkers’ Party Press, –
 /), p. .
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With regards to anti-revolutionary forces in socialist states, they are rebels and traitors
against the People’s interests and the scum of society, violating the human rights of
the People. To these anti-revolutionaries, the term human rights itself is completely
inappropriate. A socialist country is not a class-transcending society and there is no
place for rebels to stay. As we do not conceal or lie about our partiality, we do
not obscure our class-consciousness in the context of human rights. Socialist human
rights are not class-transcending human rights to grant freedom and human rights to
hostile enemies who oppose socialism, or to disobedient traitors who stand against
the People’s interests. Our human rights are the rights that legitimise the persecution
of enemies of the class, violating human rights of the People, workers, peasants or
intellectuals.46
%ere is a group of North Korean scholars who take a classic Marxist stance
on human rights: his denial of human rights under any capitalist system as
a normative value and his idea of man as ‘species-being’.47 A North Korean
Marxist rights theorist, Cho˘ng So˘ng Kuk, refuses to accept the ideas of human
rights which, he believes, originated in the Western bourgeois tradition.48
Cho˘ng says that an individual cannot exist apart from his class status. %is
class-conscious rights conception denies the ‘universality’ of human rights
that many Western scholars as well as the United Nations declared in .
Human rights, in this context, are ‘divine’ rights of the ‘social’ human being
‘who lives and develops his life independently and creatively’. Individual rights,
according to him, are respected ‘only when they coincide with collective inter-
ests and contribute to the subsistence and development of the society he
belongs to’. Cho˘ng concludes that the most fundamental right above all,
in a socialist society, is ‘the sovereign right of the People’, as a collective
entity.
Cho˘ng also insists that the pursuit of life, freedom and happiness in the 
American Declaration of Independence, and the rights to freedom, property
and security in the  French Declaration, were all bourgeois concepts of
46) Anonymous, Ch’amda’un ingwo˘n’u˘l wihayo˘.
47) Steven Lukes, ‘Can a Marxist believe in human rights?’, Praxis International, Vol. 
(), p. ; Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, ‘%e German ideology’, in Collected
Works, Volume : Marx and Engels – (London: Lawrence and Wishart, ),
p. ; Richard Nordahl, ‘A Marxian approach to human rights’, in Abdullahi Ahmed An-
Na’im (ed.)Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, ), p. .
48) Cho˘ng So˘ng Kuk, ‘Puburu˘ju’a ingwo˘n rironu˘i pandongjo˘k ponjil’ (%e reactionary nature
of bourgeois human rights theories), Ch’o˘rhak yo˘ngu (Philosophical Studies), Vol.  (),
pp. –.
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rights which reflected the interests of capitalists.49 He explains that the Amer-
ican Declaration, for example, did not mention anything about anti-slavery
or the emancipation of the working class from exploitation and repression. By
the same token, the French Declaration included nothing about freedom of
assembly or association. Similarly, an anonymous writer on socialist constitu-
tional theory interprets that both the  English Magna Carta and the 
French Declaration were to serve the material interests of the newly established
‘property-driven manipulative bourgeoisie’.50 One of the KWP’s human rights
commentators, Pak Tong Ku˘n, refers to Shylock, the main character of Shake-
speare’sMerchant of Venice, in order to describe the ‘greedy nature’ of capitalist
society.51
Cho˘ng Kyo˘ng So˘b interprets contemporary Western human rights from
a Marxist perspective. Cho˘ng identifies Richard Flathman, Ronald Dworkin
and Robert Nozick as bourgeois law scholars who represent the interests of
imperialists by emphasising private property rights and abstract norms such
as freedom and equality.52 He insists that, in a class society, there cannot be
‘classless’ concepts of freedom or equality; only those who possess national
sovereignty and the means of production can enjoy a right to freedom and
equality. Cho˘ng also criticises Cranston, Flathman, Strauss and Raphael as
reactionary bourgeois scholars for they only recognise civil and political rights
as true human rights, excluding socio-economic rights. Furthermore, Cho˘ng
denies the Christian-based concept of human rights as rights that are given
by God. Like Marx’s historical materialism, Cho˘ng argues that the protection
of human rights depends on the socio-political structure of society. Cho˘ng
concludes that human rights are an intrinsic value but are not automatically
protected; people in society must have national sovereignty and the means of
production for the true realisation of human rights.53
49) Cho˘ng So˘ng Kuk, Puburu˘ju’a ingwo˘n rironu˘i pandongjo˘k ponjil, pp. –.
50) Anonymous, Chuch’e’u˘i Sahoejuu˘i Ho˘nbo˘p Riron (%e Socialist Constitutional%eory of
Chuch’e) (Pyongyang: n.p., ), p. .
51) Pak Tong Ku˘n, Namchoso˘n Sahoenu˘n Pu’ikbu, Pin’ikbinu˘i Pan Inminjo˘k Sahoe (South
Korean Society is ‘the Rich Get Richer, the Poor Get Poorer’ Anti-People Society) (Pyong-
yang: Korean Workers’ Party Press, ), pp. –.
52) Cho˘ng Kyo˘ng So˘b,Chegukjuu˘ijadu˘ri Tto˘bo˘rinu˘n Ingwo˘n Ongho’u˘i Pandongso˘ng, pp. –
.
53) Cho˘ng Kyo˘ng So˘b,Chegukjuu˘ijadu˘ri Tto˘bo˘rinu˘n Ingwo˘n Ongho’u˘i Pandongso˘ng, pp. –
.
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In practice, North Korean education focuses on the growing gap between
the rich and poor and human rights violations in Western countries.54 A
handful of books on human rights violations and cases of discrimination
in the ROK and other Western countries have been published.55 %ere is a
small section on page  of Rodong Sinmun almost every day about human
rights violations in the ROK and the US. All the North Korean defectors I
interviewed in South Korea during October–December  said in North
Korea they had heard about racial discrimination in the US, hungry orphans
being abandoned in South Korea, or American soldiers raping innocent young
South Korean women.
Disappearance of Class Rights
Since the end of the Cold War, the DPRK government has given up lip
service to its communist ideals and become more openly nationalistic. Kim
Jong Il insists that dictatorship against ‘hostile forces’ in society is indeed ‘the
protection of human rights’:
%e dictatorship of the People’s regime against forces violating the interests of the
People is indeed the protection of human rights … ‘People’s Democratic Dictatorship’
is a powerful function of the People’s regime in an aim to guarantee democratic rights
and freedom for the People as the master of state and society.56
Kim Jong Il’s justification for his dictatorship is a post-colonial concept of
the ‘People’s regime’ rather than an orthodox Marxist class claim. Indeed,
strong post-colonial nationalism seems to overtake class-consciousness in the
DPRK’s rights thinking (the DPRK prefers ‘socialist patriotism’ to ‘national-
ism’). Kim Jong Il confirms this ideational shift, saying that politics are ‘not
54) Kim Jong Il, Ch’o˘ngnyo˘nu˘l chojik sasangjo˘ku˘ro kanghwa hanu˘ndeso˘ naso˘nu˘n myo˘tgaji
kwa’o˘be taehayo˘, pp. –.
55) Ingwo˘n yo˘ngu mit kyoryu hyo˘phoe (%e Association for Human Rights Studies and
Exchanges), Namjoso˘nu˘i Ingwo˘n Silsang (%e Human Rights Situation in South Korea)
(Pyongyang: Pyongyang Press, ); Oh Song Hak, Ko˘kkuro Doen Sesang (%e Upside
DownWorld) (Pyongyang: Ku˘mso˘ng Ch’o˘ngnyo˘n Ch’ulpansa [Gold Star Youth Publishing
House], ); Pak Tong Ku˘n, Namchoso˘n Sahoenu˘n Pu’ikbu.
56) Kim Jong Il, ‘Uri’inmin cho˘nggwo˘nu˘i wuwo˘lso˘ng’u˘l to˘’uk nopi palyangsik’ija’ (For the pro-
motion of the superiority of the people’s regime), in Selected Works of Kim Jong Il : Febru-
ary –December  (Pyongyang: Korean Workers’ Party Press, – /),
p. .
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a struggle between diﬀerent classes’, but a ‘political device to realise people’s
sovereignty’.57 Kim Jong Il states that:
Regardless of a person’s social class, i.e. no matter whether s/he is a communist or not,
anyone can be trusted by the DPRK government and the government can cooperate
with a person only if s/he has strong patriotism, sharing the same revolutionary interests
as the DPRK.58
%is is Kim Jong Il’s so-called ‘virtuous politics’ or ‘broadly embracing poli-
tics’ (kwangp’ok cho˘ngch’i). ‘Virtuous politics’ is so pragmatic that the DPRK
government now cooperates with new post-Cold War partners such as South
Korean capitalists like Hyundai. Kim Jong Il explains this:
%e ideology that the DPRK can accept is no longer only socialism or communism.
Anyone who loves our country, our people, and our nation is eligible for serving the
People and ultimately for being a member of society. %e Party believes that those
from diﬀerent classes or diﬀerent social backgrounds, who can share the interests of
our revolution, are not temporary companions but eternal partners.59
%is shift in the DPRK’s identification of partners and enemies resulted from
the changing international environment after the Cold War.60 After the col-
lapse of the Soviet bloc, which meant a significant cut in trade and aid, the gov-
ernment had to cooperate with diﬀerent actors in international society. Strict
class-consciousness was of no use to the DPRK’s eﬀorts to guarantee its right
to survival.%e DPRK almost completely departed fromMarxism and turned
its back on class rights. Class-consciousness in its rights thinking was replaced
by loyalty-based ‘military-first politics’. %e government finally deleted ‘com-
munism’ from its  amended constitution whilst retaining ‘socialism’ and
adding ‘military-first politics’ as the oﬃcial ideology. %e DPRK is oﬃcially
no longer a communist state.
57) Nada Dakasi, Kim Jong Il Sidae’u˘i Choso˘n, p. .
58) Kim Jong Il, Sahoejuu˘inu˘n kwahagida.
59) Kim Jong Il, Sahoejuu˘inu˘n kwahagida.
60) Jiyoung Song, Human rights and the DPRK.
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Subsistence Rights
Subsistence Rights in ‘Virtuous Politics’
Subsistence rights, or more generally welfare rights or socio-economic rights,
are widely regarded fundamental international human rights.61 %e DPRK
prioritises subsistence rights over liberty-based rights. Kim Jong Il called for
‘the right to basic subsistence’ (ch’obocho˘gin saengjonu˘i kwo˘lli) in :
Imperialists do not recognise the right to work of the unemployed, the right to eat and
live of the homeless and orphans. Needless to say about a right to basic subsistence for
workers, imperialists, who have anti-People policies, racial discrimination and colonial
policies, are not qualified to speak about human rights.62
Kim Jong Il uses Chuch’e ideas, adds the concept of the right to development
at individual level, and finally defines human rights as the ‘rights of a social
human being to live and develop independently and creatively’.63 Paek Mun
Kyu, a writer for the monthly North Korean magazine Ch’o˘llima, defines
‘subsistence rights’ (saengjon’gwoˇn) as the ‘condition for a man to eat and
consume’.64 Paek makes distinction between ‘the right to subsistence’ and ‘the
right to life’ (saengmyoˇnggwoˇn), which sound similar to each other in Korean.
Paek explains that whereas the right to subsistence is ‘what you need to sustain
your life’, such as food, housing and proper medical services, the right to life
is ‘what you need to protect your body and continue free activities’.65 He then
61) For the supporters of socio-economic rights, see Christian Bay, ‘Self-respect as a human
right: thoughts on the dialectics of wants and needs in the struggle for human community’,
Human Rights Quarterly, Vol.  (), pp. –; Maritain, Man and the State; Alan
Gewirth, Reason and Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, ); Raymond
Plant, Citizenship, Rights and Socialism (London: Fabian Society, ); Rodney G. Peﬀer,
Marxism,Morality, and Social Justice (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, ); Reginald
Herbold Green, ‘Basic human rights/needs: some problems of categorical translation and
unification’, Review of the International Commission of Jurists, Vol.  (), pp. –;
Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Aﬄuence, and US Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, ).
62) Kim Jong Il, Inmindaejung chungsimu˘i urisik sahoejuu˘inu˘n p’ilsu˘ngbulp’aeida, p. .
63) Paek Mun Kyu, ‘Ingwo˘ni muchami yurindoenu˘n miguk’ (America where human rights
are seriously violated), Ch’o˘llima, Vol.  (), p. .
64) Paek Mun Kyu, Ingwo˘ni muchami yurindoenu˘n miguk, p. .
65) Paek Mun Kyu, Ingwo˘ni muchami yurindoenu˘n miguk, p. .
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uses an example of the gun problem in the US, saying that ‘there is no legal
guarantee for the right to life, not to be shot to death’.
Subsistence right is reconstituted from Kim Il Sung’s ‘right to basic living
standards’ (saenghwalgwoˇn) and the ‘right to a happy material life’ (haeng-
bokhan muljilsenghwalu˘i kwo˘lli) under Chuch’e Ideology. Kim Jong Il suggests
that an -year free public education and state medical care are the institu-
tional instruments of ‘virtuous politics’ for the DPRK’s subsistence rights.66
Kim Cho˘l, who writes for the party’s monthly magazine Ku˘lloja, also empha-
sises the important role of the motherly party in protecting the basic needs and
interests of the people.67
However, despite the fact that the DPRK prioritises subsistence rights,
people in North Korea do not recognise this as a right that they are entitled
to, but as something that can be granted by the government, depending on
its capacity. When asked to define human rights, a -year-old North Korean
defector, who fled North Korea in , answered that
I think rights have limitations. Some rights should be restrained and others can be
enjoyed.%e fact that the [DPRK] government cannot provide enough food rations to
its people is not a human rights violation.%e government is just not capable of doing
so.68
!e Post-Cold War Rights to Food and Education
%e government propaganda on its superiority regarding the right to subsis-
tence had reached its peak by the end of the Cold War, focusing particularly
on food, education and medical treatment. Kim Il Sung was proud that:
Our socialism is the supreme form of any political ideology. We have no jobless people.
%e state guarantees all the necessary conditions for workers to eat, wear, consume and
live. Most of all, we all have the right to food as a birthright. A rice ration for everyone
is an important communist policy. We also have the right to education. Preschool
children have the right to go to kindergartens and preschools. Children who reach
school age have the right to receive a free -year compulsory education and the right
to go on to university. All schools and universities are free of charge. We have free
66) Haruki Wada, Pukchoso˘n (North Korea) (Seoul: Dolbege, ), p. .
67) Kim Cho˘l, ‘Inmindaejung’u˘i chuinu˘roso˘ ch’egimgwa yo˘kharu˘l dahanu˘n ko˘su˘n sahoejuu˘i
chaedo’u˘i wuwo˘lso˘ng’u˘l palyangsikigi wihan chungdaehan yogu’ (%at the people as the master
of the society take their duties and responsibilities is an important tool to enhance the
superiority of our socialist system), Ku˘lloja, Vol.  (), pp. –.
68) Interview with L on  February , Kyunggi, South Korea.
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medical treatment so that no workers have worries about receiving proper medical
treatment for their illnesses.69
In an eﬀort to appease his people, Kim Il Sung announced ‘the Government
Ordinance to Raise the Living Expenses of All Workers and the Incomes of All
Cooperative Peasants’ on  February .70 %e ordinance aimed to provide
more living expenses for workers, more scholarships for students, and higher
incomes for peasants on collective farms. A series of economic reforms since
July , as well as opening up Mt Ku˘mkang for tourism and the Kaeso˘ng
industrial complex, are also part of the leadership’s pragmatic concession to
satisfy people’s material needs, although highly limited.
Kim Jong Il’s Failure to Protect Subsistence Rights
Despite all this propaganda, Kim Jong Il was not able to perform his duties
to protect subsistence rights for his people, failing in his role of benevolent
69) Kim Il Sung, ‘Chuch’e’u˘i hyo˘ngmyo˘ngjo˘k kachiru˘l t’u˘t’u˘ni kosuhamyo˘ sahoejuu˘i ko˘nso˘ru˘l
himitke taku˘childe taehayo˘’ (On defending the revolutionary idea of Chuch’e and strength-
ening socialism), in Works of Kim Il Sung : January –May  (Pyongyang: Korean
Workers’ Party Press, – /), p. .
70) Kim Il Sung. ‘Cho˘nch’e rodongja, kisulja, samuwndu˘ru˘i saenghwalbiru˘l nopimyo˘ hyo˘pdong
nongmindu˘ru˘i suibu˘l nu˘llinu˘n sich’egu˘l silsiham’eh taehayo˘’ (On implementing the Govern-
mentOrdinance to Raise the Living Expenses of AllWorkers and the Incomes of All Cooper-
ative Peasants), inWorks of Kim Il Sung : January –October  (Pyongyang: Korean
Workers’ Party Press, – /), pp. –. %e full text of the Government
Ordinance in , translated by the author, is as follows:
%e Central People’s Committee of the DPRK makes a decision on the ordinance today
in order to meet the substantial needs for the establishment of socialism and to raise the
living standards of the People in our country as follows:
 %e government will raise: the living expenses of all workers, engineers and oﬃce
workers; the social pensions of all pensioners; the scholarships of all students; and the
incomes of all cooperative peasants, as follows:
(a) the living expenses of all workers, engineers and oﬃce workers by . per cent;
(b) the social pensions of all pensioners by . per cent;
(c) the scholarships of all college and university students by  per cent; and
(d) the purchasing price for rice by . per cent, for corn and other crops by .
per cent (the selling price will remain the same).
 %is ordinance will come into eﬀect from March ; and
 %e cabinet will set up practical administrative policies in order to implement this
ordinance.
Jiyoung Song / EJEAS . () – 
parental leader in ‘virtuous politics’. More than  per cent of North Korean
defectors who fled the country and settled in South Korea between  and
 said that they left primarily in search of food.71 At the beginning of
the famine, only  per cent of a total of , North Korean asylum seekers
attributed the food crisis of the mid-s to Kim Jong Il.72 Many of them
said the economic crisis had been caused by natural disasters (. per cent).
Others still believe the country’s economic hardship is due to US economic
sanctions or just bad luck for Kim Jong Il.73
However, the situation has changed dramatically after the  economic
reforms. %ere has been widespread materialism and high expectation of eco-
nomic development among ordinary North Koreans, some of whom direct
their complaints against Kim Jong Il.74 Signs of market mechanisms have been
growing and the majority of North Koreans are now able to sell their products
at market.75 Slowly, North Korean collectivism has been replaced by individu-
alistic materialism.76According to testimonies of North Korean defectors, there
are three categories of contemporary rich people in the DPRK: kanbu (party
cadres), kwabu (widows) and o˘bu (fishermen). A North Korean defector, Kang
Hyokb explains that fishermen can always keep fish aside for themselves and
sell it in the marketplace to make extra cash; widows are ‘free’ women and some
of them are involved in prostitution to get money or food.77
As the number of North Koreans defecting and crossing the border grew,
people in North Korea started recognising the food crisis as a government
failure. Many North Korean defectors, including Kim Sun Ae and Pak U˘n
Ch’o˘l who left North Korea in  and  respectively, say that the DPRK
authorities failed in their ‘duties for the medical protection of their people’.78
71) T’albuk tongki yuhyo˘ng (North Korean border crossing by types of motivation) (Divi-
sion of Social and Cultural Exchange, Ministry of Unification, ), available at http://
unikorea.go.kr/kr/MIPT/MIPTBmain.jsp (accessed  November ).
72) Good Friends, Chungguk Tongbuk Aamso˘ng Chiyo˘k ,kae Mau˘l Hyo˘nji Chosa (Field-
work Research in , Villages of Northeastern China) (Seoul: Good Friends, ).
73) Interview with H on  October  and with S on  October , Seoul,
South Korea.
74) Kim Pyo˘ng Ro, ‘Kim Jong Il sidae pukhan chuminu˘ saenghwalgwa u˘isik pyo˘nhwa’
(Changes in the conception of North Korean citizens in the Kim Jong Il era), in Cho˘ng
So˘ng Chang (ed.) Pukhanu˘n Pyo˘nhago Innu˘nga (Is North Korea Changing?) (Seongnam:
Sejong Institute, ), pp. –.
75) Interview with K on  October , Seoul, South Korea.
76) Interview with L on  October , Seoul, South Korea.
77) Hyok Kang,!is Is Paradise (London: Abacus, ), p. .
78) Pukhan Ingwo˘n Simin Yo˘nhap (Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights),
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Many ordinary North Koreans condemned local cadres for the country’s eco-
nomic failure,79 or indirectly expressed their dissatisfaction with the Kim Jong
Il regime by saying, ‘I miss the time when our suryo˘ng was alive.’80 %ose who
live in Pyongyang, who know more about the regime or who have experience
outside the country, have become even more critical of Kim Jong Il and his
policies than non-Pyongyang citizens.81 North Koreans do not consider Kim
Jong Il as a benevolent fatherly leader any more. %ey do not even use the
honorific ending in normal conversation when referring to Kim Jong Il.82
Duty-based Language of Human Rights
Citizens’ Duties as the Oﬀspring of Rights
%e DPRK government adheres particularly to the idea of prioritising citi-
zens’ duties over rights, which existed in other socialist states as well as in the
Korean indigenous political tradition. Duties as the oﬀspring of rights also exist
inWestern countries as a form of preconditions for citizenship or of social con-
tract.83 In China, citizens’ (kongmin) duties are described as their ‘honour, con-
science and loyalty’.84 In Britain, New Labour’s policy on anti-social behaviour
‘Pukhan’u˘i ’u˘iryo chedo’ (%e medical system of North Korea), NKHR Newsletter (June
), p. .
79) Interview with K in  October , Seoul, South Korea.
80) Anonymous, ‘Han nyo˘so˘ng tang ilkkungwa’u˘i daehwa’ (A conversation with a female
party oﬃcial), Imjingang, Vol.  (), pp. –.
81) Yi Kyo Do˘k et al., Saeto˘min’u˘i Chu˘ng’o˘nu˘ro Pon Pukhan’u˘i Pyo˘nhwa (Changes in North
Korea Based on New Settlers’ Accounts) (Seoul: Korean Institute for National Unification,
).
82) Choosing appropriate vocabulary is of real significance in Korean language culture.%e
same objects or actions have diﬀerent vocabulary depending on who you are talking to (e.g.
a meal is pap when you talk to a junior, but siksa or chinji to a senior).%erefore, you have
to identify the relationship between the person you talk with and yourself. Similarly, ‘did’
is hasyo˘ssu˘mnida when you refer to a past act of a person who is older than you or socially
superior to you, whereas the same ‘did’ verb is haessu˘mnida when referring to a person who
is younger or has an equal or lower social status than you. In a confidential interview with a
foreign diplomat who spent three years in Pyongyang, North Koreans used a non-honorific
ending for Kim Jong Il, whereas an honorific form is still used for Kim Il Sung.
83) Charles Tilly, ‘A primer on citizenship’,!eory and Society, Vol.  (), p. .
84) Pang Myo˘ng Suk, ‘Kongminjo˘k u˘imunu˘n kongminu˘i young’ae imyo˘ ryangsimigo u˘iri’
(Citizens’ duties are their honour, consciousness, and loyalty),Ch’o˘rhak yo˘ngu (Philosophical
Studies), Vol.  (), p. .
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stated ‘no rights without responsibilities’.85 Similar to the Soviet rights schol-
ars, a North Korean human rights commentator, PangMyo˘ng Suk, argues that
the destiny of society and that of its citizens are connected as one: if the inter-
ests of the collective society are realised well, those of an individual will be
automatically realised.86
Both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il emphasised that duties should come
before rights. %e diﬀerence between the two is that Kim senior adhered to
a Marxist notion whereas his junior was not keen to do so. Kim Il Sung,
for example, stressed that ‘the superiority of a socialist system is realised not
automatically but only if the People conduct their duties and responsibilities
under the ruling party’s guidance’.87 Kim Jong Il, on the other hand, does not
refer to any socialist term while focusing more on the priority given to duties
before rights: ‘Each individual must address his or her own social obligations
before enjoying the respective rights and freedoms.’88
%e anonymous writer in North Korea explains that the rights and duties
stated in its Socialist Constitution diﬀer from one society to another: a cultural
relativist perspective.89 %e author defines rights as the ‘permitted actions to
realise people’s social needs, granted and protected by the state’ whereas duties
are ‘obligations to follow based on the state’s demands’. In a nutshell, rights are
for collective people to be granted their social needs only if they perform their
duties based on the state’s demands.
%e DPRK does not need a Marxist theory to buttress citizens’ duties:
indigenous political traditions already serve this purpose. In traditional Con-
fucian culture, which comprises role-based relational ethics and normative
behaviour, each individual has respective duties towards every other in his/
her multiple social relations. In a king–subject relation, a subject must pay his
complete loyalty and duties towards his king in return for his needs and rights
being granted by the king, for example.
85) Anthony Giddens,!e!ird Way:!e Renewal of Social Democracy (Cambridge: Polity
Press, ), p. .
86) PangMyo˘ng Suk, Kongminjo˘k u˘imunu˘n kongminu˘i young’ae imyo˘ ryangsimigo u˘iri, p. .
87) Kim Il Sung, ‘Urinara sahoejuu˘i uwo˘lso˘ng’u˘l to˘’uk nop’i palyangsik’ija’ (Stipulate the supe-
riority of our socialism), inWorks of Kim Il Sung : June –December  (Pyongyang:
Korean Workers’ Party Press, – /).
88) Kim Jong Il, Sahoejuu˘inu˘n kwahagida.
89) Anonymous, Chuch’e’u˘i Sahoejuu˘i Ho˘nbo˘p Riron, p. .
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Duties as a Correlative Term of Rights
Another usage of duties is the correlative term of human rights, the flipside of
the same coin, noted by Alison D. Renteln and supported by many other rights
theorists.90 In other words, citizens’ rights are duties of the government. %e
government’s duties are included in a number of provisions in the constitution:
the duties of the Cabinet and the Local People’s Committee to guarantee
citizens’ rights, and the functions of the Public Procurator’s Oﬃce and the
court to protect personal rights. Kim Jong Il understands people’s right to life
and property as ‘divine’ duties of government oﬃcials.91
Kim Jong Il says ‘protecting the political life of people and promoting the
rights and interests of the People are the duties of party oﬃcials trusted by
the party and suryo˘ng ’.92 Ryo˘m Kyo˘ng Yun, who writes articles for Ku˘lloja,
further insists that, on top of the duties of party oﬃcials, it is ultimately Kim
Jong Il who guides and leads them. In this regard, Kim Jong Il introduced a
political motto, ‘Serve for the People!’, to stress party oﬃcials’ self-sacrificing
attitudes towards the people and their ‘motherly nature’ in being selfless.93%is
is noteworthy in two aspects: first, Kim Jong Il distances himself from party
oﬃcials so as to evade his duty to protect people’s rights and, second, the nature
of party oﬃcials’ duties is depicted as being motherly.
To many people’s surprise, Kim Jong Il admitted to human rights violations
committed by law enforcement oﬃcers, village heads of the People’s Commit-
tee, and party oﬃcials. Speaking to provincial secretaries of the party, Kim
warned that he had known that some village heads of People’s Committees
abused their power and violated human rights in the name of ‘the Commis-
sion for Socialistic Legal Guidance’ (sahoejuu˘i po˘mmu saenghwal chido wiwo˘n-
90) Alison Dundes Renteln, International Human Rights: Universalism Versus Relativism
(Newbury Park, CA: Sage, ), p. ; Richard B. Brandt, Ethical !eory: !e Problems
of Normative and Critical Ethics (Englewood Cliﬀs, NJ: Prentice Hall, ), pp. –
; W.D. Ross,!e Right and the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ); Bradley,
Ethical Studies.
91) Kim Jong Il, ‘Sabo˘p ko˘mch’al sa’o˘bu˘l kaeso˘n kanghwahalde daehayo˘’ (On strengthening the
work of law enforcement and prosecution), in Selected Works of Kim Jong Il : –
(Pyongyang: Korean Workers’ Party Press, – /), pp. –.
92) Ryo˘m Kyo˘ng Yun, ‘Saramdu˘ru˘i cho˘ngch’ijo˘k saengmyo˘ng’u˘l pohohago inmin’u˘i kwo˘lliwa
riiku˘l onghohanu˘n ko˘su˘n tang ilkkun’u˘i ponbun’ (Protecting the People’s rights is the duty of
party oﬃcials), Ku˘lloja, Vol.  (), pp. –.
93) Ryo˘m Kyo˘ng Yun, Saramdu˘ru˘i cho˘ngch’ijo˘k saengmyo˘ng’u˘l, p. .
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hoe).94 It is noticeable that Kim Jong Il has specifically mentioned the names
of abusive ‘dictatorial’ state organs:95 () guidance departments of the People’s
Committee;96 () party and security oﬃcers;97 and () law enforcement and
prosecution oﬃcers.98 Details about specific incidents are unknown. Further-
more, it is also not very clear whether these comments were merely empty
political rhetoric or whether Kim was referring to particular crimes for which
state oﬃcials were punished.
%ere are conflicting opinions about Kim Jong Il’s actual involvement in
human rights violations in the DPRK. Some, including the US State Depart-
ment, believe that the worst human rights situation was due to Kim Jong Il’s
repressive dictatorial policy.99 Others, especially those who lived in Pyongyang
and who were given all elite privileges before they left for South Korea, say
Kim Jong Il may not know about most of the human rights violations and
corruption committed by security forces and law enforcement oﬃcers.100 It is
widespread practice that many security oﬃcers accept bribes from those who
commit petty crimes, such as watching South Korean movies, using mobile
phones or fortune-telling, under North Korean laws.101
94) Kim Jong Il, ‘To, si, kun tang wiwo˘nhoe sa’o˘beso naso˘nu˘n myo˘tgaji munje’e taehayo˘’ (On
some problems with the party’s activities in provinces, cities, and villages), in Selected Works
of Kim Jong Il : – (Pyongyang: Korean Workers’ Party Press, – /),
pp. –.
95) In North Korea, security oﬃcers and prosecution oﬃcials are all called po˘bgwan (law
oﬃcers). Interview with P on  November , Kyunggi, South Korea.
96) Kim Jong Il, To, si, kun tang wiwo˘nhoe, pp. –.
97) Kim Jong Il, ‘Charyo˘k kaengsaeng’u˘i hyo˘ngmyo˘ngjo˘k kuhoru˘l nop’i tu˘lgo cho˘ndang, cho˘n-
minu˘l iru˘kyo˘’ (Encouraging the party and the people under the motto of independent
revival), in Selected Works of Kim Jong Il : – (Pyongyang: Korean Workers’ Party
Press, – /), p. .
98) Kim Jong Il, ‘Tang’u˘l kanghwa hago ku˘ ryo˘ngdojo˘k yo˘kharu˘l to˘’uk nop’ija’ (Let us strength-
en the party and raise its leadership), in Selected Works of Kim Jong Il : – (Pyong-
yang: Korean Workers’ Party Press, – /,) pp. –.
99) US Department of State,  Human Rights Report: Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea, available at www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt//eap/.htm; Suzanne Scholte,
‘Tribunal for North Korea’,Wall Street Journal ( July ), available at http://online.wsj
.com/article/SB.html (accessed  March ); Ed Royce, ‘North
Korean human rights: recommendations for the Obama administration and the US Con-
gress’, %e Heritage Foundation ( May ), available at www.heritage.org/Research/
asiaandthepacific/hl.cfm (accessed  November ).
100) Interview with P on  November , Kyunggi, South Korea.
101) Interview with K on  November , Seoul, South Korea.
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Kim Jong Il’s criticism was certainly one of his many ambitious political
strategies to please his father, who was in power at that time, and to seek to
justify political legitimacy as the heir apparent. Kim Jong Il normally ended his
comments with a similar remark to show his filial piety towards his father: ‘You
… should conduct your … work well and implement today’s mission that I
have just suggested, so that we all can relieve the Great Leader’s concerns.’102 In
other words, human rights have to be protected so as not to cause any worries
to his father. Kim Jong Il was a more faithful son than anyone could ever have
imagined.
%e DPRK employs familial images to depict the entire society as one
family. Some experts point out this particular Confucian familism in North
Korea: Kenneth Jowitt’s ‘socialism in one family’103 and AlexandreMansourov’s
‘politics of filial piety’.104 In Confucian ‘familism’ (kajok chuu˘i), human rights
are granted by ‘the parental leader’ (o˘bo˘’i suryo˘ng) and the ‘mother party’
(o˘mo˘nidang).%e masses are, by implication, the children of the family.105
In societies like North Korea, where people were governed, successively, by
feudal kings, Japanese colonists, an anti-Japanese guerrilla leader and finally
his filial son, it is much easier to accept duties of the leader as a correlative
term of rights than as a concept of inherent natural rights within a Western
liberal tradition. Family is one of the most diﬃcult and delicate areas in
terms of implementing the concept of individual human rights, since it is
a highly personal and private unit within a society and children are socially
indoctrinated not to rebel against their parents. In North Korea, therefore,
the privacy of the family works like the sovereignty of the state, caring and
responsible parents as the leader who protects human rights, and filial children
as the people who are to perform their duties in return for the protection of
their human rights.
102) Kim Jong Il, To, si, kun tang wiwo˘nhoe, pp. –.
103) Kenneth Jowitt, ‘Moscow “Centre” ’, East European Politics and Societies, Vol.  (),
pp. –.
104) Alexandre Y.Mansourov, ‘Koreanmonarch Kim Jong Il: technocrat ruler of the Hermit
Kingdom facing the challenge of modernity’,DPRK Briefing Book, Nautilus Institute, avail-
able at www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/negotiating/issue.html (accessed Novem-
ber ).
105) Charles K. Armstrong, ‘%e nature, origins, and development of the North Korean
state’, in Samuel S. Kim (ed.)!e North Korean System in the Post-Cold War Era (New York:
Palgrave, ), pp. –.
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!e DPRK’s Constitutional Changes of Rights and Duties
%e DPRK’s constitutional changes normally occur to mark the end of one
era rather than the beginning of a new one. As shown in Figure , there have
been four constitutional changes since the first People’s Constitution in .
%e biggest change from the  People’s Constitution to the  Socialist
Constitution, in terms of rights and duties, was the deletion of the limited
rights to pro-Japanese elements.%e  constitution included the freedoms
of residence and travel (Art. ).%e latest amendment, in April , was to
include ‘the respect and protection of human rights’ (Art. ).
Some notable changes were made in the duty section as well. Tax payments
(Art. ) and protection of ethnic minorities (Art. ) were deleted in the
 Socialist Constitution.106 %e  constitution added duty to military
service and the criminalisation of betrayal of the Fatherland (Art. ).%e 
constitution made national unity the first duty (Art. ).%e most important
notion was that betrayal of the Fatherland as a most heinous crime disappeared
in the  constitution.
106) Although the regime oﬃcially insists that there are no ethnic minorities, it accepts
the fact that there are around , Korean-Chinese living in the DPRK and they have
full access to public education and medical services. Kang Yun Sok, Director-General of
the Department of Legislation, DPRK Supreme People’s Assembly, and Chairman of the
National CoordinationCommittee for the implementation of the Convention on the Rights
of the Child, at the CRC DPRK third and fourth combined review sessions,  January
.
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Fig. . Rights and Duties in the DPRK Constitutions
1948 People’s Constitution 1972 Socialist Constitution
[Rights]
Article 11. Equal rights irrespective of sex, nationality
(or race), religion, skill, property, and educational
level
Article 12. Right to vote and stand for election (age
of 20 or over) irrespective of sex, nationality, social
origin, religion, length of residence, property or
education (persons deprived of the electoral right
by the decision of a court, insane persons, and
pro-Japanese elements, not included)
Article 13. Freedom of speech, the press, association,
assembly, mass meetings and demonstrations
Article 14. Freedom of religious belief
Article 15. Right to equal pay for equal work
Article 16. Right to rest
Article 17. Right to material assistance (benefit of
social insurance)
Article 18. Right to education
Article 19. Freedom to maintain medium and
small-size industrial and commercial enterprise
Article 20. Freedom to engage in scientific and artistic
pursuits
Article 21. Inviolability of the home of the citizen and
privacy of correspondence
Article 22. Women’s equal rights with men
Article 23. Protection of marriage and the family
Article 24. Inviolability of persons and protection from
arbitrary arrest
Article 25. Right to petition
Article 26. Protection of foreign citizens
[Rights]
Article 49. Collective principle ‘all for one, one for all’
Article 50. True democratic rights and freedom, happy
material and cultural lives
Article 51. Equal rights in every political, economic,
cultural sphere
Article 52. Right to vote and stand for election
(aged 17 or over) irrespective of sex, nation (race),
occupation, length of residence, property or
education, political party, political opinion and
religion (persons deprived of the electoral right by
the decision of a court, and insane persons, not
included)
Article 53. Freedom of speech, publication, assembly,
association and demonstration
Article 54. Freedom of religious belief
Article 55. Right to appeal and petition
Article 56. Right to work and right to be paid
according to quantity and quality of work
Article 57. Right to rest
Article 58. Right to free medical services
Article 59. Right to education
Article 60. Freedom to engage in scientific and artistic
pursuits and right to intellectual property and
invention
Article 61. Special protection for revolutionary fighters
and their families
Article 62. Women’s equal rights with men
Article 63. Protection of marriage and the family
Article 64. Inviolability of persons and their home
and privacy of correspondence and protection from
arbitrary arrest
Article 65. Legal protection of overseas Koreans
Article 66. Protection of foreign refugees
[Duties]
Article 27. Abiding by the Constitution and socialist
principles
Article 28. Defence of the Fatherland
Article 29. Payment of taxes
Article 30. Engagement in work
Article 31. Protection of minority nationalities within
the DPRK
[Duties]
Article 67. Abiding by the Constitution and socialist
principles
Article 68. Respect for collective spirit, sacrifice for
the interests of the People, the Fatherland, and
revolution
Article 69. Labour as the divine duty
Article 70. Preservation of public assets
Article 71. Revolutionary spirit and protection of
national secrets
Article 72. Defence of the Fatherland and duty to do
military service/treason against the Fatherland and
the People
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1992 amended Socialist Constitution 1998 amended Socialist Constitution*
[Rights]
Article 62. Protection of kongmin under the nationality
law.
Article 63. Collective principle ‘all for one, one for all’
Article 64. True democratic rights and freedom, happy
material and cultural lives
Article 65. Equal rights in every political, economic,
cultural sphere
Article 66. Right to vote and stand for election
(aged 17 or over) irrespective of sex, nation (race),
occupation, length of residence, property or
education, political party, political opinion and
religion (persons deprived of the electoral right by
the decision of a court, and insane persons, not
included)
Article 67. Freedom of speech, publication, assembly,
demonstration and association
Article 68. Freedom of religious belief
Article 69. Right to appeal and petition
Article 70. Right to work and right to be paid
according to quantity and quality of work
Article 71. Right to rest
Article 72. Right to free medical services
Article 73. Right to education
Article 74. Freedom to engage in scientific and artistic
pursuits and right to intellectual property and
invention
Article 75. Special protection for revolutionary fighters
and their families
Article 76. Women’s equal rights with men
Article 77. Protection of marriage and the family
Article 78. Inviolability of persons and the home and
privacy of correspondence and protection from
arbitrary arrest
Article 79. Protection of foreign refugees
[Rights]
Article 62. Protection of kongmin under the nationality
law.
Article 63. Collective principle ‘all for one, one for all’
Article 64. True democratic rights and freedom, happy
material and cultural lives
Article 65. Equal rights in every political, economic,
cultural sphere
Article 66. Right to vote and stand for election
(aged 17 or over) irrespective of sex, nation (race),
occupation, length of residence, property or
education, political party, political opinions and
religion (persons deprived of the electoral right by
the decision of a court, and insane persons, not
included)
Article 67. Freedom of speech, publication, assembly,
demonstration and association
Article 68. Freedom of religious beliefs
Article 69. Right to appeal and petition
Article 70. Right to work and right to be paid
according to quantity and quality of work
Article 71. Right to rest
Article 72. Right to free medical services
Article 73. Right to education
Article 74. Freedom to engage in scientific and artistic
pursuits and right to intellectual property, invention
rights, and patent rights
Article 75. Freedom of residence and travel
Article 76. Special protection for revolutionary fighters
and their families
Article 77. Women’s equal rights with men
Article 78. Protection of marriage and the family
Article 79. Inviolability of persons and the home and
privacy of correspondence and protection from
arbitrary arrest
Article 80. Protection of foreign refugees
[Duties]
Article 80. Safeguard politico-ideological unity and
solidarity
Article 81. Abiding by the Constitution and socialist
principles
Article 82. Respect for collectivism, sacrifice for
the interests of the People, the Fatherland, and
revolution
Article 83. Labour as a divine duty
Article 84. Preservation of public assets
Article 85. Revolutionary spirit and sacrifice for
national security
Article 86. Defence of the Fatherland and duty to do
military service/ treason of the Fatherland and the
People
[Duties]
Article 81. Safeguard politico-ideological unity and
solidarity and sacrifice for the interests of society
and the People
Article 82. Abiding by the Constitution and socialist
principles
Article 83. Labour as a divine duty
Article 84. Preservation of public assets
Article 85. Revolutionary spirit and sacrifice for
national security
Article 86. Defence of the Fatherland and duty to
military service
Note: * Unchanged in the 2009 amended Socialist Constitution.
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Conclusion
From a constructivist perspective, this paper has shown that North Korea’s ‘our
style’ human rights have been evolving and are multi-faceted: they have been
transformed from and by post-colonial nationalism, Marxism and traditional
Korean political cultures. North Korea’s right to national survival has been
reconstituted from the post-colonial sovereign right of the people. Kim Il
Sung’s Chuch’e Ideology transformed this idea into the concept of the sovereign
right of man and the nation, and Kim Jong Il subsequently reconstituted
it as the sovereign right of the state, i.e. sovereignty, which is no longer a
human right. In practice, the DPRK’s adherence to sovereignty has been so
rigid and defensive that it has made North Korea even more isolated from the
international community. On the other hand, the DPRK’s sovereign right to
independent national survival has led the leadership to make some pragmatic
concessions in the field of human rights.
Marxism was of no use for the DPRK’s national survival in the changing
post-Cold War environment, and therefore it was replaced by more flexible
nationalistic approaches towards capitalists. %e DPRK government deliber-
ately converted the formal identities of enemies and partners, and consequently
altered its policy behaviour to cooperate with anyone ‘who loves the coun-
try and the nation’, i.e. no matter whether he is a capitalist or not. %e gov-
ernment opened up Mt Ku˘mgang and Kaeso˘ng to work with South Korean
entrepreneurs such as Hyundai.
‘Our style’ human rights under ‘virtuous politics’ is a relapse to indigenous
Korean cultures. %e role of a benevolent government taking care of people’s
material well-being came from the country’s indigenous political tradition
including Confucianism. All the main features in ‘our style’ human rights
of the DPRK, i.e. its usage of familial images such as parental leader and
motherly party, people’s filial piety and absolute loyalty to the leader, and the
protection of human rights as rewards bestowed by the leader, owe much to
Korea’s Confucian values. After the end of the Cold War, however, the fatherly
leader, Kim Il Sung, has gone, and his filial son was seen failing in his ‘heavenly’
duties to take care of his people. %is failure has led to a greater emphasis
on ‘military-first politics’, which uses military images depicting Kim Jong Il,
who never served in the army, as ‘General’, and the citizens as his subservient
loyalists. Accordingly, citizens’ duties are framed as loyalists’ mission to protect
the nation and Kim’s leadership. No room for any individual or liberal concept
of human rights.
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On the one hand, the government cooperates with the international human
rights society for the right to national survival and, on the other, it builds
nuclear/missile facilities for the sovereign right of the state to defend itself from
foreign powers.%ese two contrasting behaviours, as well as public discourses,
demonstrate that it is in a core process of ideational and behavioural transfor-
mation, moving back and forth within the field of human rights. Survival is
and will remain the main theme in the discourse of human rights in North
Korea for the time being.
